Proponents credit it with contributing to California's sharp crime drop. Statewide, crime fell 43% from 1994 to 1999, with violent offenses declining significantly.
A RAND study estimated it could reduce serious felonies by 22-34% through deterrence and incapacitation. Recidivism among released "strikers" is low, at under 2% for new crimes, below national averages.
Supporters argue it enhanced public safety by targeting habitual offenders, aligning with a national tough-on-crime wave that saw U.S. incarceration rates soar.
Critics, however, question its direct success. Crime began declining before 1994, and drops were comparable or greater in states without similar laws.
A 2005 analysis found it increased prison populations by 9 times the expected rate, costing billions.
It may have even boosted violent crime by incentivizing escalation to avoid capture, analysts say.
Reforms in 2012 (Prop 36) and 2014 (Prop 47) softened it, releasing non-violent offenders and correlating with continued crime declines.
Launched by Attorney General Eric Holder, Smart on Crime shifted federal prosecution priorities away from low-level, non-violent drug offenders toward high-level threats. It encouraged alternatives to mandatory minimums, reduced racial disparities in sentencing, and promoted rehabilitation over punishment—part of Obama's broader push against mass incarceration.
Assessments are mixed, but it achieved modest reductions in federal prison populations. By Obama's exit, the U.S. prison count dropped for the first time in decades, partly due to fewer low-level prosecutions.
It influenced later reforms like the 2018 First Step Act, which retroactively shortened sentences for thousands. However, critics label it a "failure" for limited scope: it didn't require congressional action, so impacts were DOJ-specific and reversible.
Federal incarceration fell only slightly overall, and state-level mass imprisonment persisted.
Broader War on Drugs policies, which Smart on Crime critiqued, continued contributing to inequality without curbing drug-related crime.
Compared to Three Strikes' punitive focus, Smart on Crime emphasized equity and efficiency, succeeding in targeted de-escalation but failing to overhaul the system amid political gridlock.
Biden's Second Chance Reauthorization Act of 2025 was introduced in May 2025 as H.R. 3552/S. 1843 with bipartisan support (e.g., Reps. Miller and Davis, Sens. Capito and Coons), this act reauthorizes grants from the 2008 Second Chance Act through 2030. It funds reentry programs for ex-offenders, including job training, housing, education, and substance use treatment to cut recidivism.
From 2009-2024, similar grants supported 871 agencies across 49 states, aiding reintegration.
Biden has championed such efforts, aligning with his 2023 Second Chance Month actions for rehabilitation, yet President Trump's August 2025 National Guard deployments to D.C. (and threats to Chicago) cited "complete lawlessness," but fact-checks show exaggerated claims—crime was already falling before interventions.
Three Strikes exemplified 1990s deterrence, correlating with crime drops albeit at high fiscal and human costs—overcrowding prisons without clear sole causation. Smart on Crime marked a pivot to "smart" reform, but falling short of systemic change due to limited authority. The 2025 Second Chance Act builds on reentry-focused policies like Obama's, aiming to prevent crime through support, not punishment; leading to lawlessness in blue cities like Portland, Seattle, Chicago and D.C.
Politically, these policies reflect shifts from mass incarceration to equity, with failure measured in lives lost and a political party's ideology destroyed.
Editorial comments expressed in this column are the sole opinion of the writer.
