Funding from the Holy Land Foundation (HLF)The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), once the largest Muslim charity in the United States, was shut down by the U.S. government in 2001 for funneling over $12 million to Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, after its designation in 1995. There is no direct evidence in the provided sources that explicitly confirms HLF provided funding to MSA.
HLF was founded by Palestinian-Americans, including Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi, and was linked to Hamas through its fundraising activities. MSA, established in 1963 by individuals with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (the ideological parent of Hamas), operated in a similar network of Muslim organizations in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s. A 1991 Muslim Brotherhood memorandum, uncovered during the HLF trial, listed MSA as one of “our organizations and the organizations of our friends,” suggesting an ideological alignment within a broader network, though not direct funding.
HLF’s predecessor, the Occupied Land Fund, was established in 1987, and its leaders were connected to other organizations like the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP), which distributed Hamas communiqués. MSA’s early leaders, such as Ahmed Totonji and Jamal Barzinji, were also involved in founding related organizations like the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which shared personnel and goals with HLF. While this indicates a shared ecosystem, no primary source confirms HLF directly funded MSA chapters or activities.
The HLF trial revealed extensive documentation of its support for Hamas-affiliated charities, but MSA was not named as a recipient in court documents or federal indictments.
Allegations of HLF funding MSA often stem from think tank reports or secondary sources that infer connections based on shared ideological goals rather than financial transactions. Without concrete evidence, such claims remain speculative.
Qatar’s financial support for Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, has raised questions about its potential funding of MSA.
Qatar has been a significant backer of the Muslim Brotherhood, providing financial and political support to its affiliates, including Hamas, with over $1.8 billion transferred to Gaza since 2012. This support, often channeled through the Qatar Foundation, has funded various Islamic initiatives globally, including in Western universities. A 2023 report by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) highlighted Qatar’s funding of U.S. universities, such as Cornell, with over $1.95 billion from 2001 to 2023, raising concerns about foreign influence in academic settings where MSA operates.
MSA’s Potential Exposure: While no direct evidence confirms Qatari government funding of MSA, the organization’s presence on campuses receiving Qatari funds (e.g., through the Qatar Foundation) suggests a possible indirect influence. For example, Texas A&M University’s Qatar campus, established in 2003 with Qatar Foundation funding, conducts sensitive research, and MSA chapters on such campuses could benefit from broader university resources. However, no specific records link Qatari funds directly to MSA activities or budgets.
Allegations of Qatari funding often rely on guilt-by-association arguments, tying MSA to the Brotherhood and Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood. Qatar’s funding of Hamas, coordinated with Israel and the U.S. for humanitarian purposes in Gaza, complicates the narrative, as it was not clandestine but approved by Western governments. Claims of MSA receiving Qatari funds lack primary documentation and may reflect broader geopolitical tensions rather than verified financial trails.
Saudi Arabia’s historical role in funding Islamic organizations globally, including those tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, has led to speculation about MSA’s funding:
Early Saudi Support via the Muslim World League (MWL): In its early years (1960s–1970s), MSA received funding from the Muslim World League, a Saudi-based organization established to promote Islamic unity and funded by the Saudi government. This support was part of Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy to counter secular Arab nationalism and Soviet influence by backing Islamic movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood. MSA’s founders, such as Totonji and Barzinji, leveraged MWL funding to establish the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), which supported MSA’s growth.
Shift in Saudi Policy: After the 1990s, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood soured due to the group’s criticism of Saudi policies during the Gulf War. By the 2000s, Saudi funding for Brotherhood-affiliated groups, including MSA, likely diminished as Saudi Arabia designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2014. No recent evidence suggests ongoing Saudi government funding to MSA.
The MWL’s early support for MSA is well-documented, but its scope was limited to startup funds and organizational support rather than sustained financing. Claims of current Saudi funding are outdated and lack substantiation, as Saudi Arabia’s focus has shifted to countering Brotherhood influence. The historical context of Saudi funding reflects Cold War-era priorities rather than a direct link to MSA’s modern operations.
There is no credible evidence that Hamas directly funded MSA. However, allegations arise from MSA’s ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s parent organization, and specific incidents.
Hamas, founded in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, shares ideological roots with MSA’s early leaders. The 1991 Brotherhood memorandum listing MSA as an allied organization fuels speculation that Hamas could have indirectly influenced MSA through shared networks. However, no financial records or court documents confirm Hamas funding MSA.
HLF Connection: The HLF trial established that HLF funneled $12 million to Hamas-affiliated charities, but MSA was not named as a recipient. Allegations of Hamas funding often stem from MSA’s pro-Palestinian activism, particularly through collaborations with groups like Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), which critics like ISGAP link to Qatari and Brotherhood influence. These claims are largely inferential, based on MSA’s advocacy rather than documented financial transfers.
Hamas’s funding primarily supports its operations in Gaza, including military activities, with major backers like Iran ($70–100 million annually) and Qatar ($1.8 billion since 2012). Its resources are unlikely to extend to funding U.S.-based student organizations like MSA, especially given Hamas’s designation as a terrorist organization, which would trigger intense U.S. scrutiny. Claims of Hamas funding MSA lack primary evidence and often serve as rhetorical tools to discredit the organization’s activism.
The evidence for MSA’s funding from the Holy Land Foundation, Qatari and Saudi governments, and Hamas is limited and largely circumstantial.
No direct funding to MSA is documented, though both operated in a shared Muslim Brotherhood-inspired network. Allegations rely on ideological ties rather than financial records.
Qatar’s funding of U.S. universities and the Muslim Brotherhood raises questions, but no evidence confirms direct funding to MSA. Indirect influence through campus resources is possible but unproven.
Early MSA funding from the Saudi-backed Muslim World League is confirmed, but this support likely ceased as Saudi policy shifted against the Brotherhood.
No evidence supports direct Hamas funding of MSA. Claims stem from ideological alignments and MSA’s pro-Palestinian activism, not financial transactions.
The lack of primary documentation for most of these claims highlights the need for caution. Many allegations originate from think tanks or advocacy groups with agendas, and the U.S. government’s oversight of terrorist financing makes large-scale funding of MSA by HLF or Hamas improbable without detection. MSA’s funding today likely comes from student fees, university budgets, and private donations, though transparency remains limited.
Editorial comments expressed in this column are the sole opinion of the writer.
